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Public Trust Protection for
Stream Flows and Lake Levels
By RALPH W.

JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION

The public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights
system are headed on a collision course in the West.' Appropriators claim vested property rights to extract water for irrigation,
mining, manufacturing and other uses. They further assert that
under the appropriation doctrine such extractions can continue
in perpetuity regardless of the consequences to navigation,
fishery and other public values.' The public, however, increasingly insists on more protection for environmental and ecological
values, aesthetic quality and recreational opportunities, which
on lakes and streams usually means leaving waters in place. As a
result, the courts are being asked to apply legal doctrines that
*
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' See generally GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW,
FINAL REPORT (Dec., 1978), and the six staff papers published by the Commission, particularly A. SCHNEIDER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSTREAM WATER USES IN
CALIFORNIA (1978), which summarize California's problems with conflicts between various water rights doctrines and between different groups of water
users.
" Thousands of rivers, streams and lakes in the West are dried up completely by appropriators each year with disastrous consequences for fish and
other living things which depend on water for survival. Countless other water
bodies, so depleted by diversions, either annually or occasionally, are totally
changed from their natural state and become an entirely different ecological
habitat. For example, a wetland may become a dry wash. Most of these diversions are for irrigation, which in 1970 accounted for some 83% of the water
consumed by all users in the U.S. and 90% of the water consumed in the western 17 states. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE
[hereinafter cited as WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE].
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will place limits on these water extractions. 3 One such doctrine,
flexible enough to consider and draw a fair balance between
these contending forces, is the public trust doctrine. This article
explores the use of the public trust doctrine for this purpose.
Expanding the application of the public trust doctrine to reflect new public priorities is neither surprising nor radical. Many
other examples can be found where the courts have, during this
century, created, expanded or altered some moribund or limited
legal doctrine to accommodate changes in public priorities concerning water use. For example, courts have (a) expanded the
navigation servitude theory on both the state and federal levels
to protect the public rights of navigation;4 (b) developed the reservation doctrine under the Property Clause of the Federal Constitution to protect Indian reservation irrigation rights' and to
provide for sound management for other federal lands;6 (c) de3 This conflict is not new; it is simply getting worse and thus more noticeable as time goes by. In 1973 the National Water Commission said:
State laws creating and protecting rights to the use and enjoyment
of water fail to give adequate recognition to social (that is,
noneconomic) values in water. This omission derives in the west
from the law of appropriation, which embodies the social preference during the period of its formulation for economic development over protection of such social values as esthetics, recreation,
and fish and wildlife propagation....
Id. at 271; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(Sierra Club trying to force the U.S. Department of the Interior to assert, define and protect federal reserved water rights); People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d
301, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1980) (state suing to protect against loss
of public rights by unauthorized diversion); California Trout, Inc. v. State
Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (3d Dist.
1979) (private group appealing denial of instream appropriation application);
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd.,
197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570 (1979) (Conservation Board applied for minimum
stream flow rights under new state act).
4 See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960);
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968). See generally Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1 (1963).
5 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
6 United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435
(1955). In Cappaertthe Court recognized federally reserved water rights and
used them to preserve the now-famous "pupfish," which lived in the subterra-

1980]

Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels

235

veloped the equitable apportionment doctrine in interstate litigation;7 (d) upheld use of interstate compacts;8 (e) upheld the
nean pool in Devils Hole National Monument-at the expense of an irrigation
project.
7 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S.
419 (1922).
8 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938). An interstate compact binds all private water users in participating
states regardless of their in-state priority dates.
There is an unresolved question of whether the abrogation of state-granted
rights by operation of a U.S. treaty is a taking that requires compensation.
Constitutional lawyers point to Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), for the proposition that a treaty cannot authorize that which the Constitution prohibits, i.e., a taking without compensation under the Fifth Amendment. During the 1950's this question was the focus of considerable political and legal debate related to the "Bricker
Amendments." See Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in Historical Perspective,
1975 Sup. CT. Rv. 77; Looper, Limitations on the Treaty Power in Federal
States, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1959); Ely, A Hidden Hole in the Fifth
Amendment: Treaty Power Versus Property Rights: A Substitute for the
Bricker Amendment, 59 DICK. L. Rav. 299 (1955) (discussing the few existing
cases). International law experts question both the scope of the treaty and
whether equitable apportionment is the applicable law. Power Auth. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538 (1957). See Van Alstyne, InternationalLaw and
InterstateRiver Disputes, 48 CALW. L. REv. 596 (1960); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS (A. Garretson ed. 1967). Some water lawyers, analogizing from internal federal law, see Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405
(1925), as well as from Holland, assert that such an action would not be a
taking. See Trelease, FederalLimitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L.
REV. 399, 414-15 (1961); 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 105, 152.3 (E. Clark,
ed. 1967); 3 W. HUTcHINs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 140 (1977). The 1944 agreement between Mexico and the United States
over the Colorado River, 59 Stat. 1219 (1944), is the clearest example of the
conflicting and divergent viewpoints. When the Senate ratified the treaty, it
concurrently passed a resolution "that nothing in the treaty or protocol shall
be construed as authorizing the Secretary of State directly or indirectly to alter
or control the distribution of water to users within territorial limits of any of
the individual states." Id. at 1265. Thus, while the United States may not have
been constitutionally required to pay just compensation, Congress in order to
reach a consensus felt it necessary to limit that power. 91 Cong. Rec. 3373
(1945). For an interchange of the water law and constitutional law points of
view, see House of Delegates, First Session, 30 A.B.A. J. 624, 659-60 (1944);
Breitenstein, Water Administration Under the Proposed Treaty with Mexico,
31 A.B.A. J. 67 (1945); Pound, Reply, 31 A.B.A. J. 69 (1945).
The United States-Mexico water treaties have not been judicially tested to
date. If they are, the resolution of the conflict will be further complicated by
the Secretary of Interior's formula for allocating federal reclamation waters
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exercise of the state police power by which the states regulate
vested water rights; 9 and (f) recently found that pueblo water
rights 0 superseded vested appropriative water rights. These
courts rejected the argument that eminent domain should be the
only means available to extinguish private water rights, recognizing that in many situations, eminent domain is too costly, too
cumbersome, too time-consuming, and not required by the equities of the water rights holders. More importantly, they also realized that the needs of a community-be it pueblo or nation-may outweigh the needs of the appropriator.
Historically, farmers, cities and industries have all relied upon
lakes and streams as sources of water supply for their own purposes. As the demand from these water users has continued to
grow, the available water supply has diminished. As a result, the
search for new sources has become more aggressive, even desperate. 1 Traditionally, consumptive water users are frustrated by
the growing public clamor that some of these remaining waters
should be declared "off limits"; they argue that judicial recognition of in-place water protection claims will nullify their vested
rights and defeat their legitimate expectations.
The current litigation over the diversion of water from the inlet streams to Mono Lake is illustrative of the conflict between
long-standing appropriators and in-place water users.1 2 Mono
Lake, lying east of Yosemite National Park, is the second largest
natural body of water wholly within California.1 3 Because of its
high salinity level, no fish can survive there. However, the lake
supports an extra-abundant supply of brine shrimp and brine
flies, which attracts millions of migratory birds that rest, feed
under the Colorado River Interstate Compacts.
9 Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d
489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935).
10 New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1121 (1977).

"

See generally 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER

RESOURCES 1975-2000, at 2-82
12 National Audubon Soc'y

(1979).

v. Department of Water & Power, No. 6429
(Super. Ct. Mono County, Cal., filed May 21, 1979), removed, No. 80-127 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 20, 1980). References in this article to the case, causes of action and
defenses are based on the initial state court proceedings.
"3Mono Lake is about 13 miles long and eight miles wide with a present
volume of about two million acre-feet. The salinity level is about 10%, or three
times the level of seawater.
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and nest on the lake."
The National Audubon Society filed suit to limit long-standing water diversions by the Department of Water and Power of
the City of Los Angeles (DWP), which holds appropriative rights
to extract water from the inlet streams to Mono Lake for municipal purposes.1 5 The DWP condemned the littoral/riparian
rights of adjacent lakeside owners in the mid-1930's.' 6 It has
been diverting water from the lake since 1941.
The National Audubon Society alleges"' that the level of the
lake has dropped dramatically below its level as a "natural
lake," and that the lowering of the lake has exposed 14,700
acres of previously submerged land. The Society claims that, if
DWP diversions continue, the lake will shrink to about half its
"natural" surface area and about eighteen percent of its "natural" water volume.19 At this lower level, some 30,000 acres of former lake bed will be exposed. The complaint also alleges that
the continued lowering of the lake will destroy the lake's brine
shrimp and brine flies, thus eliminating the basin as a major
bird habitat, as well as destroying the local brine shrimp harvesting industry.2 0 The exposure of additional lake bed will increase the occurrence of mineralized dust storms that already
plague the area, causing health hazards to nearby residents and
damage to vegetation, and will further harm the aesthetic and
recreational opportunities provided by the lake environment.
" Complaint at 4, 5, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water &
Power, No. 6429 (Super. Ct. Mono County, Cal., filed May 21, 1979), removed,

No. 80-127 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1980).
15State Water Resources Control Board License No. 10191 (1974), and Permit No. 5555 (1940), in Complaint at 8.
16 City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (3d Dist.
1935) (valuation upon condemnation). The case is suggested reading for anyone seriously interested in the present Mono Lake controversy. It discusses the

condition of the lake and basin at the time and the expected changes.
" Proposed Pretrial Statement. This is not the only time that controversy
has raged over Los Angeles' appetite for distant water supplies. See E. CoopER,
AQuEDucT EMPIm (1968); R. NAD, u.THE WATm SEEKERis (1950).
" Complaint at 4-13.
" The complaint alleges that the level of the lake has already dropped more
than 30 feet because of the diversions and is currently falling at the rate of
approximately two feet per year; the lake presently contains approximately

57% of the volume it had as a "natural" lake. If the DWP diversions continue
the lake will drop another 50 feet.

1o Complaint at 4, 16, 17, 18, 19.
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The Society asserts several different causes of action2 1 in an
attempt to enjoin further DWP diversions of water from the basin. Notably among them is a claim that the DWP has violated
the public trust.
In its defense, the DWP points out its vested appropriation
rights2" under the California Water Code to continue extracting
and diverting2 3 water from the basin. In reliance on these rights,
it has expended millions of dollars building dams, conduits and
pipes"' to carry water to the residents of Los Angeles, who depend on this source of supply. The DWP also claims
that it has
2
no reasonable alternative sources of water supply. '
Regardless of its merits, the Mono Lake case exemplifies the
type of legal action that will increasingly find its way into the
courts as competition heightens between water extractors and
"in place" users.26 This type of litigation raises several imporThe plaintiffs' causes of action are:
1) Violation of the public trust;
2) Violation of California Constitution art. XVI, § 6;
3) Quiet Title;
4) Public and Private Nuisance;
5) Violation of California Constitution art. X, § 4.
Complaint at 20.
22 Answer to Complaint at 5, 6, 10.
23 An explanation of the choice of terms is necessary at this point. The terms
"extraction" or "withdrawal" will be used to describe the removal of water
from the water system, be it from a lake, stream or groundwater by a user, no
matter whether the user is a riparian, an appropriator or a permittee. See note
26 infra. Conventionally, both are associated only with groundwater. Diversion
is a term of art important in the appropriation doctrine and will be used in
that narrow sense.
24 Answer to Complaint at 8.
25 Proposed Pretrial Statement at 19-20.
" For another recent case on the issue, see In re Waters of Long Valley
Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1980).
The old saw in Colorado is that "the water follows the money." In California
the water may follow the political power. A safe generalization is that no major
judicial decision about water in California is safe from collateral attack. The
court's decision in Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252
P. 607 (1926), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 486 (1927), led to the amendment of the
California Constitution two years later. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly CAL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 3). Statutes and regulations have been enacted or repealed
due to such political pressures. A good example is the entire history of the
Central Valley project. See generally C. MEYEs & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:

A

CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

322-82 (2d ed.

1980). Water is so scarce and such a necessary commodity that it is unlikely
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tant theoretical and practical questions." Does the public trust
doctrine limit the amount of water that an appropriator or riparian can extract from a lake or stream where the extraction
causes damage to navigation, commerce, fisheries, wildlife or
other public trust interests? Can a state be enjoined from issuing further permits for future withdrawals of water that would
result in such damage? Does the public trust doctrine operate
"retroactively" to limit the amount of water that existing extractors, with vested appropriative or riparian rights,2 8 can withthat any state decision that would have a major political impact would be immune from review or alteration by a coordinate branch of state government.
27 The outline of the proposed pretrial statement provides another checklist
of issues. Many of them will not be dealt with in this article, either because of
their dependence on California law or because of the variations in procedural
matters between various state and federal courts. Several of these issues--standing, the actual wording of the state constitutions and water statutes, as well as the prior development of several lines of case law within a
state-are critically important to anyone framing a public trust case.
2e Water extraction rights generally arise from one of three sources in the
West:
1) Under state law, based on a custom prevalent in the West and sanctioned by the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 263, 14 Stat. 253, and the Desert Land
Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377. Both relate to appropriation of water on
federal lands;
2) Under state statutory systems, where the extractor applies to the state
agency for a license or permit to extract an explicit amount of water under
certain terms and conditions; or
3) Under state law, based upon a variation of common law riparian rights,
where an owner of riparian land was entitled to make "reasonable" use of the
water. Reasonable use included extraction for irrigation, manufacturing, domestic and other beneficial uses.
Typically, in most states, early rights were created and proved up under the
prevalent state doctrine, either riparian or appropriation. In some states, including California, riparian and appropriative rights co-existed. The conflicts
between the two sets of rights in the latter states and the problems of proving
and administering water rights in all of the western states led to the adoption
of statutory permit systems beginning in the early 1900's. During the transition, some classes of existing rights were grandfathered in, while other classes
had to apply for permits or lose their rights; still other classes of right were
denied. Thus, after a definite point in time, all rights would be granted by
permit only. Nearly all extraction rights acquired in recent years are based on
permit systems that are the statutory implementation of pre-existing customary appropriation rights. For the most recent judicial analysis of the relationship between the riparian and appropriation systems in California, see In re
Waters of Long Valley Creek System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 350 (1980). See generally E. Clark, supra note 8; W. HUTCHINS, supra
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draw from a lake or stream?
This article outlines the scope of the public trust and appropriation doctrines. It reviews the leading cases expressly and impliedly dealing with the points of contact and conflict between
the two doctrines in order to construct a doctrinal framework
within which to analyze cases such as Mono Lake. Finally, it
uses this framework to predict how a court might approach such
.issues and cases in the future.*9
I.

THE SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The public trust doctrine has historically been used to protect
the public interest in certain unique, valuable and irreplaceable
natural resources.80 Its scope, however, is difficult to define. The
doctrine's clearest application has been to preserve public ownership in the beds and foreshores of navigable waters in order to
protect public rights of navigation, commerce and fishery overlying those lands."1 In more recent years, as concern about the loss
note 8; C. MEYERs

ed. 1979).

&A. TARLOCK, supra note 26; F.

TRELEASE, WATER LAW

(3d

2 Earlier articles by this author on the subject of public rights of navigation,
fishery, etc., on western lakes and streams did not express the views espoused
herein concerning the interrelationship of the public trust and other doctrines
and the respective lines of cases. See Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to
Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH. L. REv. 580 (1960); Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RzsouRcEs J. 1 (1967). In fact, no mention of the public trust doctrine is made in
either of these articles. Years of additional research, teaching and worrying
about these questions have produced a different perspective. It is like the story
of the blind man and the elephant. Earlier research revealed those parts of the
beast discovered at that time by the blind man. During the intervening years,
while the elephant has not changed much, further search has allowed the blind
man to discover more of the elephant's anatomy.
3o See W. RODGERS, ENViRONMENTAL LAW 170-86 (3d. ed. 1977), which gives
extensive treatment to the definition, scope and current content of the public
trust doctrine; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judical Intervention,68 MIcH. L. REv. 471, 477, 556 (1970). This article relies on and builds from these sources. The reader is urged to refer back to
these sources for general materials. The principal burden of this writing is to
analyze the critical contact points between the public trust and appropriation
doctrines. Thus, it is only cases and writings pertinent to that narrow focus
which are given treatment here. The abbreviated definition of the public trust
doctrine given here can only be fully understood after one has studied the actual cases where the doctrine has been applied.
S1 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). On the origins of the
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of in-place water opportunities has increased, courts have expanded the doctrine in some states to protect the public interest
in bathing, swimming, recreational boating, aesthetics, climate,
scientific study, environmental and ecological quality, wildlife
preservation"s and the allocation of water. Significantly, one of
the main thrusts of the cases articulating the traditional public
trust doctrine has been to protect the public interest in in-place
uses of water. However, it is also significant that only one of
these cases has expressly involved a conflict between the appropriation and the public trust doctrines.
Merely to describe the existing applications of the public trust
doctrine does not define its potential scope. If we take a more
functional approach to the scope of the doctrine and look past
the labels to the interests protected,38 the rationale of the decisions" and the results obtained, 5 we find a much larger group of
cases that can and should be identified as public trust decisions.
One of the main purposes of this article is to define this broader,
functionally oriented public trust doctrine, since it is likely to
impact the western prior appropriation system in the future.
A.

TraditionalPublic Trust Doctrine

First, let us look at the opinions that have traditionally been
identified by their authors, or by recognized legal scholars, as
public trust decisions. What constraints would these cases place
on the appropriation doctrine if they were used to protect inpublic trust doctrine, see Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust:
An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 SKA GRAT L.J. 13 (1976); Sax, supra note 30; Note,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Tidal Cases: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALz L.J. 762 (1970).
31 "The permissible range of public uses is far broader, including the right to
hunt, bathe or swim and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural
state as ecological units for scientific study." Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,
259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
" That is, the public interest in in-place water uses for navigation, fishery,
environmental quality and wildlife preservation.
The unifying and underlying rationale of these decisions is the dramatic
increase in the public interest in in-place water uses. This interest has made

the issue a powerful political and social force in recent years and has led the
public into the courts in increasing numbers to demand protection for those
uses.
" That is, the fact that these protections have required and successfully
produced a significant redefinition and reduction of countervailing private
property rights.

242
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place water uses? In approaching this question it will be helpful
to categorize the cases in which courts have already applied the
public trust doctrine and then to examine their potential impact
on future lake- and stream-level preservation cases.
Courts have traditionally used the public trust doctrine to:
(1) Require express legislative action. In Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Commission," Robbins v. Department of Public
Works,3 7 and City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda
County,"8 the Massachusetts and California courts used the doctrine to require express legislative action before permitting a
state park (Gould), a swamp (Robbins) or a tide flat (Berkeley)
to be committed to private or specialized public uses.39
36 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).

355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969).
26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
119 (1980).
39 A somewhat related issue arose in Washington. See Wilbour v. Gallagher,
77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). The
plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from filling his portion of the bed of
Lake Chelan, a large navigable lake heavily used for recreational purposes.
While the Washington court in Wilbour never explicitly mentions the public
trust doctrine, the rationale of the decision, the interest protected and the result obtained all identify it clearly as a public trust case. For a general analysis
of Washington law in the public trust area, see Johnson & Cooney, Harbor
Lines and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington Navigable Waters, 54
WASH. L. REV. 275 (1979).
When Wilbour v. Gallagher was decided, Washington had no Shoreline
Management Act. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 90.58.010-.930 (Supp. 1978).
The local county had no zoning or permit requirement controlling such fills.
The Corps of Engineers was unconcerned because commercial navigation was
not obstructed; Congress did not enact the expansive § 404 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendment until 1972. The court used common
law principles to enjoin the fill as an unlawful interference with the public
right of navigation. In the now-famous footnote 13, the court cast a cloud on
future fills in Washington's navigable waters by suggesting that a planning,
zoning and permit process ought to be available to allow public participation in
the decision process for such activities. For the definitive article on this case
and footnote 13, see Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public Permission: Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WASH. L. REV. 65
(1970).
Wilbour v. Gallagher,with a boost from Professor Corker's authoritative article, is credited as being a major factor in bringing about the enactment of
Washington's Shoreline Management Act in 1971. Developers wanted the Act
in order to remove the cloud created by Wilbour; the environmentalists wanted
it to legitimize public participation in the decision process and to exert some
environmental control over shoreline development.
31
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(2) Invalidate legislation. In Priewe v. Wisconsin State
Land & Improvement Co.,40 the Wisconsin court relied on the

doctrine to declare invalid legislation which had authorized a
private developer to drain a lake for a housing development.
(3) Affirm legislative rescission. In Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Illinois,41 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine to affirm legislation rescinding a conveyance of the bed of Lake
Michigan in front of the City of Chicago.
(4) Test for excessive delegation. In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission," the Massachusetts court used the public
trust doctrine to invalidate an excessive delegation of authority
to a private company to develop and operate a state park and
ski area.
(5) Require broad-based decision-making. In Meunsch v.
Public Service Commission,'43 the Wisconsin court used the doctrine to deny a local government the power to commit a statewide resource (a fishing stream) to power generation purposes,
thus requiring more broadly based political decision-making.
(6) Affirm a public trust easement. In People v. California
Fish Company44 and Marks v. Whitney,'45 California courts held
that, although a private individual may hold "legal" title to the
bed of navigable waters, that individual cannot use the bed in a
way that interferes with the public trust rights of navigation,
commerce, fishery, wildlife habitat, etc., in the overlying waters.
(7) Require comprehensive water planning. In United
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission,46 the court prohibited issuance of water appropriation permits for coal-related power- and energy-produc93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
41 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
43 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, affd on reh., 261 Wis. 515, 55 N.W.2d 40
(1962).
" 166 Cal, 576,. 138 P. 79 (1913).
45 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
4.
41

46 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) Cf. City of Eau Claire v. Department of Natural Resources, 2 ENvm. L. Rsp. 20512 (Dame County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1972),

where the trial court held that the public trust did not apply to underground

waters since they are not "navigable." The main issue in that case concerned
pollution and the power of the legislature to delegate authority. A similar fact
pattern has been raised in a yet undecided case, Kelley v. Hooker Chem. &
Plastic Corp., No. 79-22878, ENVm. L. REP. 65617 (Ingraham County Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1979).
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tion facilities until a comprehensive water-use plan was
completed which would take account of such in-place uses as
navigation, commerce and fishery. The court explicitly ruled
that the public trust doctrine applied to the allocation of waters
as well as to conveyances of land that underlie or abut water
resources.
(8) Require reasonable effort to mitigate resource harm.
The Wisconsin cases47 and a recent Pennsylvania decision4' held
that even where the destruction of a public trust. resource is justified because of some overriding public purpose to be served,
the actor must make all reasonable efforts to minimize the harm
to the public trust resource.
It is noteworthy that with the exception of Gould, all of these
cases expressly invoked the public trust doctrine to protect inplace uses of water. Thus, even the traditional public trust cases
have long accorded a high priority to this public interest.
B.

Expanded Public Trust Doctrine

Once we move away from the cases that have traditionally
been recognized as public trust cases, we find three other groups
of decisions that seem to be in function, if not in name, public
trust cases. These are (1) riparian rights cases that protect lake
and stream levels against water extractors; (2) navigation servitude cases; and (3) public use cases. In addition, the variety of
steps taken by legislatures and administrative agencies in recent
years to protect in-place water uses have tended to protect public trust interests.
1. Riparian Rights Cases Protecting Lake and Stream Levels
against Water Extractors
Riparian rights accrue to persons who own land abutting a
stream or lake. These rights exist because of the natural relationship of land and water and include the rights to access, to
boat, swim, fish and to extract water for irrigation and other
47 City of Madison v. State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957); State v.
Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957); City of Milwaukee
v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).
48 Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aff'd, 468 Pa.
226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976). Although argued as a public nuisance case, Professor
Rodgers properly points out that Payne is functionally a public trust case. W.
RODGFRS, supra note 30, at 177.
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beneficial uses.
The earliest cases which protected natural lake and stream
levels against damaging extractions used the riparian rights doctrine.'9 However, the doctrine had limited potential. In the
West, it was available only in the three coastal states of California, Oregon and Washington, which had adopted in tandem both
the riparian and appropriation systems. Even there, courts used
it only occasionally for this purpose. The riparian rights doctrine
was not available at all in the western mountain states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah
and Wyoming, which had early rejected riparianism and had
opted for "pure" appropriation systems.
Two cases, Los Angeles v. Aitken5" and In re Martha Lake,5 1
illustrate application of the riparian rights doctrine. In Martha
Lake, decided in 1929, the Washington State Supervisor of
Water Resources had issued a permit for the appropriation of
water from a lake which would have lowered the water level
about twelve inches and bared from eight to fifty feet of muddy
lake bottom. The riparian owners had purchased their fast lands
for homesites and for its ready access to fishing, swimming and
boating. The court rejected the argument that the statutory appropriation permit gave paramount status to appropriators and
held that the water could not be extracted unless the riparians
were first compensated for the damage that would be caused to
their lands.
In City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 decided in 1935, a California. court held in an eminent domain proceeding that Los Ange4
Several states approached the problem of stabilizing lake levels statutorily. For example, three midwestern riparian states passed lake level statutes in
the 1930's and the 1940's. Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-13-1 (Burns 1973)
(first adopted in 1947, ch. 350, 1947 Ind. Acts 1409); Michigan, MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 11.300(1)-.300(26)(1973) (first adopted in 1937, repealed and amended
several times until the passage of Pub. Act No. 146, 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts 206);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.43 (West 1977) (first adopted in 1947, ch.
142, 1947 Minn. Laws 218). It is noteworthy that these states are dotted with
many medium- to small-sized lakes which are in heavy demand for recreational

purposes.

" 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (3d Dist. 1935).
152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929). See also In re Clinton Water Dist., 36
Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950); Litka v. City of Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259,
9 P.2d 88 (1932). For an analysis of these cases, see Johnson, supra note 29, at
593-95.
51 10 Cal. App. 2d 450, 52 P.2d 585 (3d Dist. 1935).
51
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les must pay damages for condemnation of the riparian rights of
landowners abutting a navigable body of water, Mono Lake. The
City planned to appropriate the waters of Rush and Lee Vining
Creeks, which supplied about ninety percent of the lake's inflow.
These extractions would eventually expose much of the lake bed,
producing unsightly mud flats and dust plains and would ruin
the vegetation on nearby lands when wind-swept mineralized
dust settled there.
Because of the heavy salinity of Mono Lake, the littoral owners had made no domestic use of the water and had extracted
none for irrigation, mining or other beneficial uses. However, the
lake was highly valued for pleasure boating, swimming, duck and
goose hunting, and scenic beauty, all of which would be seriously
impaired or destroyed as a result of the appropriations. All of
these customary uses were nonconsumptive, in-place uses. The
City of Los Angeles argued that, since the public enjoyed these
recreational uses in the same way as the adjacent landowners,
they were really "public rights," the loss of which did not entitle
the adjacent owners to special compensation. The public was not
represented in the case.
The court rejected the City's argument and held that the riparian landowners did have special, compensable rights by virtue
of their ownership of riparian land and unique relationship to
the water. Further, it held that in-place recreational uses of the
58
lake were "beneficial" uses under the California Constitution.
2.

The Navigation Servitude Cases

The navigation servitude" cases pose another example of a
"s The City had argued that art. 14, § 3 of the California Constitution, which
declared that riparian owners in California were limited to "such water as shall
be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served," denied the littoral
owners any right to compensation for loss of in-place uses for boating, swimming and hunting because such uses were not "beneficial." City of Los Angeles
v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 450, 467-68, 52 P.2d 585, 588-89 (3d Dist. 1935).
The phrase "navigation servitude" can refer to either of two parallel doctrines: one at the federal level, represented by the line of cases starting with
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) through United States v. Rands,
389 U.S. 121 (1967), and the other at the state level, represented by such cases
as Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); and Commonwealth v. Thomas, 427 S.W.2d
213 (Ky. 1967). For purposes of this section of the article, the implicit meaning
of navigation servitude is state navigation servitude, for it is the individual
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doctrine that should be treated as a part of the public trust doctrine. Traditionally, the courts have attached the "public
trust"-rather than the "navigation servitude"-label to the
theory used to constrain state conveyances of title to the beds of
navigable waters to protect public rights of navigation, commerce and fishery. This doctrine applies only where the state
holds, or has in the past held, title to the lands in question. The
doctrine operates by limiting or qualifying the title conveyed by
the state to these lands,5 5 much as a recorded easement burdens
land conveyed without mention of the easement.
The navigation servitude, on the other hand, imposes a dominant easement on navigable water beds without regard to the
source or intervening chain of title to those lands. It applies
even where title to the land was never held by the state, such as
when a homestead title went directly from the federal government to a private party." The navigation servitude usually operates to justify nonpayment of compensation to private persons
whose property interests have been damaged or destroyed by a
government project on navigable waters undertaken in aid of
navigation.57 The federal cases have even held, however, that the
states that have the greatest interest in preserving the public right to navigation on the smaller streams and lakes. This is not to say that there will not be
cases where the "public" and the state will be in conflict over the effect of
imposing the navigational servitude, especially in California. For example, the
highway in Colberg could have blocked ingress and egress to a public boat
ramp instead of the Colberg's drydock. See Morreale, supra note 4; Comment,
State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAN & WATR L. REv. 521 (1969). See generally 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 8, for discussions of the nature and the balance of
force between the federal government and the states.
55 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 516, 138 P. 79 (1913).
" See San Diego County Archeological Soc'y v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d
923, 927, 146 Cal. Rptr 786, 788 (1978), where the court stated, "[H]owever,
the public trust doctrine applies only to limited types of real property to which
the state holds or.held title because it was important the land be available to
all. It does not involve private property except where the state has conveyed
the land into private hands." There is another conveyance pattern that raises
some interesting conceptual problems-land which was conveyed into private
ownership by the previous ruling nation/state. The Spanish or Mexican land
grants in California potentially raise this problem.
17 The navigation servitude doctrine has been applied in a majority of the
other states only when the project that damages private property interests is in
aid of navigation. Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191 (Alas. 1973), and Commonwealth v. Thomas, 427 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1967), both exemplify the majority
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federal navigation servitude applies to nonnavigable tributaries
of navigable waters, where the purpose of the project is to aid
navigation on the lower, navigable part of a river.68
Where the facts are such that both doctrines could apply,
there is no clear line separating them. For example, California

Fish,5 ' the foundation case for the public trust doctrine in California, was a decision in which the court said that grantees of

tidelands from the state took "bare" legal title subject to the
public easement for navigationO-a statement that could as well

be attributed to the navigation servitude.

In Colberg, Inc. v. State,1 the California court explicitly recognized the integrated nature of these two concepts, saying that
"the state's servitude operates upon certain private rights . . .
whenever the state deals with its navigable waters in a manner
consistent with the public trust under which they are held." 2

Thus, if we look past the labels, we see that both the public
trust doctrine and the navigation servitude are in these instances protecting the same fundamental public right: the right
of navigation in navigable waters.

3.

Public Use Doctrine

The public use" doctrine is so closely allied and so parallel to
position. California previously discussed and rejected the majority position in
Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968). In California and a minority of states, the navigation servitude can be invoked whenever the state project is consistent with the
public trust in navigable waters and is consistent with the improvement of
commercial traffic and intercourse. Thus no compensation is required, even
though the immediate impact of the project is to block access from a small
navigable bay to open waters. For example, in Colberg, the impact was to destroy the plaintiff's shipbuilding business. Id. at 419-20, 432 P.2d at 10-11, 62
Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
" United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); see Morreale, supra note 4.
People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
o Id. at 597-99, 138 P. at 88.
67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
949 (1968).
1 Id. at 421, 432 P.2d at 11-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10 (relying both on a
string of cases from other jurisdictions and "sound public policy").
" The term "public use" has been used arbitrarily, as there is no other convenient handle for the group of cases using this theory. Jus publicum encapsulates the modern cases dealing with "public use," but it also carries along some
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the public trust doctrine in its protection of in-place water uses
that it can justifiably be claimed as a part, or a different form of
expression, of the public trust doctrine. Courts have used the
public use doctrine, developed largely since the Second World
War, to protect the public right of navigation on waters that are
recreationally but not commercially navigable, where the beds
are generally privately owned."
Under the early common law, the owner of the bed of a lake or
stream had the exclusive right to use the water surface over his
land." A landowner was said to own "ad coeleum," i.e., to the
sky. This rule posed no real threat to the public right of navigation on commercially navigable waters because the beds underlying those waters were generally owned by the federal govern-

ment prior to statehood and by the states thereafter. In the
occasional case of private ownership of the bed, the early public

trust and navigation servitude doctrines effectively assured that
such private ownership did not impair the public easement for
navigation.
intellectual baggage that the modern courts have found unnecessary to voice,
e.g., State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980). See generally Deveney,
supra note 31.
For a review and analysis of public use cases, see Johnson & Austin, supra
note 29. Other law review articles since have dealt with the subject on a stateby-state basis or have focused on specific aspects of the subject. See, e.g.,
Stone, Legal Background on Recreational Use of Montana Waters, 32 MONT.
L. REV. 1 (1971); Knuth, Bases for the Legal Establishment of a Public Right
of Recreation in Utah's "Non-navigable" Waters, 5 J. CONrrEMP. L. 95 (1978);
Note, Ownership of Navigable Water Bottoms-California Co. v. Price Revisited, 36 LA. L. REV. 694 (1976); People v. Mack: A Sportsman's Definition of
Navigability, 3 ENVT'L L. 68 (1973); Note, Property-Susceptibilityof Beds of
Navigable Waters to Private Ownership, 50 TuL. L. REV. 193 (1975); Comment, Public Recreation on Non-Navigable Lakes and the Doctrine of Reasonable Use, 55 IowA L. REV. 1064 (1970); Note, Water and Water
Courses-RecreationalRights-A Determinationof the Public Status of West
Virginia Streams, 80 W. VA. L. REv. 356 (1978); Note, Waters and Watercourses-Rights of the Public in Non-Navigable Waters, 42 Miss. L.J. 270
(1971).
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979), is a reminder that in some
jurisdictions traditional property law has not yielded to the pressures of
change. The Colorado court held in that case that the public trust doctrine
does not alter the private property rights when the bed of a stream or lake is
privately owned. While it is in keeping with Colorado's position as the last
defender of "Simon-pure" appropriation doctrine, the position seems difficult
to defend in a state where stream fishing is immensely popular.
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A different problem arose on waters which were not commercially navigable." Ordinarily in such cases, the title to the bed
was held by the riparian owners. As recreational uses became
more popular, the courts developed the public use theory out of
a need to find a doctrine that recognized a public right to boat,
swim and fish on those waters, even though the beds were privately owned.
Only occasionally have decisions favoring the public right of
navigation attributed their results to the public trust or navigation servitude doctrines. In a now well established line of cases,
however, various state courts have developed three other sources
of public rights to navigation. 7 Some courts hold that the public"' right of boating on waters of which the beds are privately
owned is a "riparian right."" Other courts attribute the public
right to the Northwest Ordinance and to state constitutions
which reserve to the public a right to travel over the Mississippi
and Missouri rivers, their tributaries and the carrying places between." A third group bases the public right on declarations in
state constitutions that the waters in the state belong to the
"public." Because these public waters have always flowed across
private land, these courts reason that the public boating on such
"Navigable" is a word of art, perhaps even of sorcery. It is used here to
cover the widest possible variation of meanings, including the evolving federal
definition and the 50 different state definitions. My water law expert colleague,
Professor Corker, argued persuasively as long ago as 1970 that the whole concept of navigability for determining anything other than the floating of a supreme court opinion should be abandoned. The concept is confusing, slippery,
unpredictable, antique and irrelevant to today's problems. See Corker, supra
note 39, at 76-81. However, the concept is firmly embedded in water law jurisprudence. It is frequently mouthed and still occasionally used by courts and
legislatures today. See, e.g., State v. Mcllroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980).
67 For further discussion of these three lines of cases, see Johnson & Austin,
supra note 29, at 41.
" The apparent mixing and matching of "public" and "riparian" rights need
to be clarified. On nearly all western lakes of significant size, the state owns
riparian land either outright or in the form of highways, access roads or the
like. Thus the state is a riparian and can allow the "public" to enjoy the benefits of those riparian rights. Cf. Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, 756-57, 420
P.2d 352, 356 (1966) (discussing reasonableness of the state's riparian use relative to the other riparians).
" Typical of this theory are Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d
689 (1960), and Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
70 E.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
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71
water does not surcharge that easement.
The development of these new theories to protect public navigation rights on navigable waters has been accompanied by a
parallel expansion in the definition of navigability to cover more
and more waters. The early English rule7 2 was that navigability
for the public right of use extended only to waters where the
tide ebbs and flows. This rule was rejected early in the United
States as unsuited to a country where great rivers flowed inland
for hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles. Thus, the rule
adopted here was that waters are navigable for public use if they
are "navigable in fact" for commercial purposes, whether or not

subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." The state courts ex-

panded this definition even further after World War II because
of the massive increase in recreational boating, fishing, etc., so
that it now also includes waters which are "recreationally"
navigable.74
At the same time that the courts were expanding the definition of navigability, they were also diminishing the importance
of bed ownership in finding a public right. The early cases often
noted state ownership of the beds of navigable waters as a reason for, or at least source of protection for, the public right of
navigation. For most courts, such bed ownership is no longer so
important. Courts are increasingly finding theories to support
public rights of navigation on virtually all boatable waters. This
trend brings these cases more in line with the traditional public
trust doctrine cases which also tend to diminish the importance
of bed ownership.
These "public use" cases may properly be classified as part of
the public trust doctrine. Although the cases seldom mention
the public trust doctrine explicitly, they are nonetheless predicated on the principle that navigable waters should be available
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
Monticello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
73 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
14 See Johnson & Austin, supra note 29. The 1980 Arkansas case of State v.
Mclroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980), is illustrative of the latest expansion of
navigability to include recreationally navigable waters. The older Arkansas
cases had held that the public right of navigation extended only to waters
which were commercially navigable. In Mcllroy the court followed the lead of
the Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan and other state courts and explicitly
changed its test of navigability to guarantee the public a right to use recreationally navigable waters.
7'

7' The
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for public use under a theory that does not require eminent domain proceedings to condemn the bedowner's rights. As such,
they operate as public trust cases.
An important question still remains. Assuming that these
public use cases are expressions of the public trust doctrine, how
would they affect the outcome of a case where an appropriator
takes water from a stream and causes damage to public navigation and fishery rights? To date the public use cases have arisen
out of conflicts between the public, which wants to boat on certain waters, and bed owners, who claim exclusive rights of possession of the surface of those waters overlying their lands. No
public use case poses a conflict between an appropriator whose
extractions would destroy navigation, and the public which
wants the water left in place.
Los Angeles v. Aitken7 5 and Martha Lake7 seem relevant

here because they, at first blush, provide the basis for legal protection of in-place public uses. But the development of the public use line of cases over the past thirty years suggests that the
future might well see the judicial application of these principles
as constraints on appropriators. The argument is as follows:
prior to the advent of the public use cases, the courts tended to
rule that the property rights of bed owners were paramount to
public rights of navigation and fishery. The increasing public demand for recreational boating, fishing and environmental protection in the post-war era caused the courts to develop legal theories that supported these public rights and constrained private
bed owners. It would be consistent with this trend and a logical
next step if the courts now found that these public rights of navigation and fishery are potent enough to constrain appropriators
whose water extractions would similarly destroy or deny the
public uses.
4. Legislative and Administrative Protection of In-Place
Uses of Lakes and Streams
In recent years some states have enacted legislative measures
to protect in-place uses of lakes and streams. The Federal Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act 77 has been the impetus for many of these

11 City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 460, 52 P.2d 585 (3d Dist
1935).
• In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287
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measures" which, like the federal act, protect designated waters
because of their "wild," "scenic" or "environmental quality"
characteristics. Ordinarily, such a designation protects these waters, usually rivers or streams, from the construction of "improvements," i.e., dams, reservoirs or diversion channels, in order to preserve the existing natural conditions. One consequence
of these protective acts is to protect both existing and future inplace uses of the waters. States have also enacted statutory
moratoriums on further appropriations." In contrast to a moratorium on actual appropriations, the Colorado River Basin Project Act s imposed a ten-year ban on the study of any transbasin
diversion of the Columbia River s ' by any federal agency, partly
to protect in-place water uses. In addition, some state legislatures have broadened state law definitions of navigability to provide more extensive protection
of navigation and other public
82
rights of in-place water uses.
Some states have also taken administrative actions to protect
in-place uses. 83 Dewsnup and Jensen8 list twenty-two adminis(1976)).
'8 See R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, STATE LAW AND INSTREAM FLows 61 (1977),
for a list of many of the state acts.
19 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-8-105(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This Act established a moratorium for three years on new appropriations from the Yellowstone River.
0 Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556
(1976)).
01 Id. § 201. It should be noted that both of these moratoriums were highly
political in nature, both having the effect of buying time while searching for a
more permanent and effective solution to a critical long-term problem.
" In the Final Report of the National Water Commission, it was recommended that "[s]tate legislatures can and should liberalize their tests of navigability for purposes of the public trust, thus bringing more waters. . . within
the ambit of public use." WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE, supra note 2, at
279.
A few states have legislatively assigned all or part of the unappropriated waters of the state to a state agency to be managed in the public interest until the
waters are appropriated to other permanent uses. North Dakota assigned all
unappropriated waters to the Water Conservation Commission to use in fulfillment of its power, including the stabilization and restoration of the state's waters for recreational and wildlife purposes. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-02-14, 29
(1960 & Supp. 1979). The Commission has also been given an option of appropriating for its own purposes any of the excess water in its management. The
specified procedure is simply one of sending notice to the state engineer, thus
obviating the need for full administrative hearings.
"See R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, PROMISIO STRATEGIES FOR RESERVING IN-
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trative or agency actions that have been taken to protect instream values, some of which are pertinent here. Those which
bear the closest relationship to lake and stream level maintenance are (1) direct reservation of instream flow; 85 (2) administrative moratorium on new appropriations;8 6 (3) use of statutory
criteria specifically designed to protect instream values in reviewing applications for appropriations; 7 (4) placing conditions
in appropriation permits designed to preserve instream flow
needs;8 (5) imposing a more stringent burden of proof on applicants for large appropriations to establish the quantity of water
needed;8 9 and (6) appropriation by a state agency for environmental, recreational, historic or scenic purposes.9
The federal government has also increased its protection of
navigable waters by adopting an exceedingly broad definition of
navigability in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend(1977); R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, supra note 78. See generally
Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report
on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211. The author is
indebted to Dewsnup and Jensen for their two fine studies, and to Tarlock for
his insightful law review article. The studies and article speak mainly to the
problems of "stream flow" maintenance rather than lake level maintenance.
The term "in place" has been used throughout this article to include both
streams and lakes. Conceptually, lake level maintenance can be treated as a
less complex subset of the problems and variables associated with stream flow
maintenance. Many of the same techniques and criteria will apply to either
physical situation.
" R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, supra note 78, at 10. The examples footnoted
are drawn from the text of that report; additional applications are cited by
those authors in the table at 71.
STREAM FLOWS

CODES ANN. § 85-2-316 (1979).
OR. REV. STAT. § 536.410(1) (1979).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Supp. 1979).

" MONT. REV.
"

87

Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr 770 (3d Dist. 1974); CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1253-1259 (West 1971). See also California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978) (construction of New Melones Dam).
89 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-885(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
90 State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530
P.2d 924 (1974); COLO. Rv. STAT. §§ 3792-102(3), -103(4) (1976); see California
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 2d 816, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 672 (3d Dist. 1979); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90
Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1st Dist. 1979); Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798
(1965).
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ments of 1972.91 It has used this definition in combination with
other federal acts9" to expand its authority over federal waters
and to limit fills and other obstructions that interfere with public navigation, fishery and environmental values.
These legislative and administrative protections for in-place
water uses confirm the high priority now accorded these values
by society. They also affirm the inadequacy of the appropriation
system for providing suitable legal protection for these values.
And lastly, they are, in effect, significant governmental expressions of the public trust theory aimed at protecting in-place
water uses. As such, they lend policy support to judicial efforts
to achieve these same goals.

II.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PUBLIC TRUST AND THE
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINES

One might well ask why the public trust and appropriation
doctrines have not crossed paths-or swords-more frequently
in the past. A closely related question is why the prior appropriation system did not develop its own protections for in-place
water uses. Why does this issue arise now rather than 100 years
ago when the appropriation system was evolving? One finds the
answer by examing the particular history of the West and the
conditions that prevailed there when the appropriation doctrine
was developing.
The appropriation system grew out of the practical needs of
settlers in the arid western United States during the 19th century. Water was scarce yet essential for both mining and farming. In many cases the only way to mine or farm effectively was
to divert water from a stream and carry it long distances-often
from another watershed-by ditches to the mine or farm. No
federal or state laws or regulations controlled such water diversions during the early settlement days. Out of a need to bring
some order to a potentially chaotic situation, the miners and
farmers developed the customary rule that "first in time is first
in right." That is, the first person to divert water from a stream
or lake obtained a legal right to continue doing so in perpetuity.
9' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976).
9' Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407
(1976); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1976);
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 (1980).
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A second principle established early on was that a water user did
not acquire a "legal" right to appropriate until the water had
been actually diverted out of the stream or lake and put to beneficial use."'
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the prior appropriation system seldom impinged on the public rights of navigation.
This was for several reasons. First, the early diversions were
from the smaller rivers and streams and seldom harmed public
interests; alternative in-place water-use opportunities were usually available to the public. Second, the "public" at that time
consisted largely of the same miners and farmers who participated in and depended directly on the appropriation system. It
did not yet include today's large, urban populations which are so
far removed from farming and mining. The urban public's huge
appetite for outdoor recreation and aesthetic and environmental
quality had yet to arise.
It was not until the second quarter of the 20th century, long
after the West was settled and long after the prior appropriation
system was a fully developed legal doctrine, that the in-place
water users found their interests in conflict with those of the
appropriators. Early disagreements arose in the 1920's and
1930's in suits between private parties where landowners tried to
stop appropriations that interfered with their in-place uses of
the water. "4 Truly "public" objections were seldom raised
against appropriations until the post-Second World War growth
of recreational boating and the more recent environmental
movement. "5 In recent years it has become increasingly clear
that the appropriation system, if allowed to continue unrestrained, will adversely affect and in some cases destroy valuable
93 A novel exception to this rule occurred in an early Colorado case, Empire
Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913), where the

court required that enough water be left instream to maintain a waterfall and
the microenvironment associated with it but only because the economic interests of a resort were involved. No "public" rights were at issue in this case.
" See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 460, 52 P.2d 585

(1935); In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929); Litka v.
City of Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932); see text accompanying

notes 52-53 supra.
05 See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d, 129 (1955); Taylor v.
Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950); Brown v. Ellingson 224 So. 2d 391
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1970); Hoo-

ver v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960).
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in-place commercial and recreational water uses.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the public
trust doctrine may soon limit the amount of water that can be
extracted from a lake or stream under the prior appropriation
doctrine. Where withdrawals of water reach a point that threatens damage to navigation, fishery, wildlife protection or other
public trust interests, the courts will be asked to determine
whether further extractions will be permitted under the strict
criteria" developed for permitting the loss of public trust resources. Needless to say, this could sharply inhibit such extractions. However, to hold otherwise would be to permit these highly valued public rights, protected so carefully against intrusion
from other directions, to be destroyed with impunity by persons
claiming water rights under the prior appropriation (or riparian)
system of water law. Furthermore, it would fly in the face of the
current judicial, legislative and administrative trends toward
protecting these resources and permitting their loss only under
strict safeguards. If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain
fills which destroy navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, 97 it should equally apply to constrain the extracThe strict criteria affecting both the procedural and substantive limitations on changes to public trust resources are discussed by W. RODGERS, supra
note 43, §§ 2.16(b) & (c). Two recent cases on this issue are City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980), and Morse v. Oregon Div. of
State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979).
9 State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957). As an
indication of the U.S. Supreme Court's thinking. on this subject, see Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892):
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the
erection of wharves, docks and piers therein, for which purpose the
State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as
their disposition is made for such purposes, no valid objections can
be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks,
and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels
which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and water remaining, that are chiefly considered
and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative
power consistently with the trust to the public upon which such
lands are held by the State. But that is a very different doctrine
from the one which would sanction the abdication of the general
control of the State over lands under the navigable waters of an
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tion of water that destroys navigation and other public interests.
Both actions result in the same damage to the public interest.
This article previously presented eight types of actions that
courts have already ordered under the authority of the public
trust doctrine. 9s A preliminary way of analyzing their potential
impact on water extraction is to apply these cases to theoretical
conflicts between extractors and in-place users and then gauge
the extent to which they could limit extraction. In theory, the
courts could rule as follows under the public trust cases:
(1) In Massachusetts" and California 0 " the courts have sufficient precedent to require express legislative authority to extract
water where such extraction would damage navigation or some
other public trust interest. In other words, the fact that a valid
appropriation permit had been issued by a state water agency
under general statutory authority would not be sufficient authority to extract water. Nor would it be sufficient that the extractor
claimed a common-law "riparian" right to take such water.
(2) A Wisconsin court, on the authority of Priewe,101 could rescind a legislative grant of a water right that would completely
destroy a navigable lake. In fact, Priewe is just such a case. The
only distinction is that in Priewe the purpose of the extractions
was to drain the lake, whereas in this hypothetical the purpose
of the extraction is to make beneficial use of the water. The impact on navigation would be the same in both cases.
(3) Suppose that a state legislature granted to a private company a right to extract water from a navigable lake or stream,
thereby giving it power to control or destroy the navigability of a
large section of the waters in front of a city. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central,1 0 2 courts would uphold a legislative rescission of such a grant against the claim
entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not
consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the
public.
" See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra.
"Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d
577(1969).
100 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515,
606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
101 Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67
N.W. 918 (1896).
10, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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that it was an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation.
(4) In Massachusetts, under Gould v. Greylock,10 3 a court
could strike down as excessively broad any statutory or administrative delegation of authority to a private person over waters
essential for preserving the public right of navigation or some
other public trust interest.
(5) Suppose that a state legislature or agency delegated control over water extraction or use to a local government. A Wisconsin court under Muensch" 4 could declare invalid any such
delegation that threatened to destroy statewide interests in navigation, fishery or some other public trust interest.
Suppose that a water extractor has or has applied for a state
appropriative permit or a judicially recognized common law riparian right to extract water from a lake or stream.
(6) A California court following CaliforniaFish 0 5 and Marks
v. Whitneyr" might hold that while such a person has a legal
right to extract water, such rights, like title to the bed of the
coastal sea, are burdened with the public trust and cannot be
used so as to destroy that trust interest.
(7) The Pennsylvania'" and Wisconsin 0 8 courts could hold
that the extractor must use all reasonable efforts to mitigate or
minimize any threatened damage to public trust interests.
(8) A North Dakota court under United Plainsmen'0 " could
require that before any such extraction would be legally authorized, the extractor would have to complete a comprehensive plan
demonstrating appropriate recognition and protection of any
threatened public trust interest.
(9) Under the navigation servitude cases, the federal governGould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114
(1966).
104 Muensch v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on
reh., 261 Wis. 515, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1962).
10 People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 130 P. 79 (1913).
6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
107 Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aff'd, 468
Pa. 826, 361 A.2d 253 (1976).
10" City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927); State v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957); City of Madison v.
State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957).
'" United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota Water Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
108
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ment"1 I and (at least in theory) the state governments would
have the power to proceed with a project that caused damage to
an appropriator, such as cutting off an out-of-basin diversion,
where such action was required to protect and enhance the public right of navigation.
(10) The question presented by Los Angeles v. Aitken"" and
In re Martha Lake" 2 is a more complex one. Assume that in
California or Washington a business or a city wanted to extract
water from a lake for some beneficial use, but the extraction
would damage navigation, wildlife, fishery or other in-place values. The riparian owners on the lake would attempt to enjoin
the extraction on the theory that it threatened their riparian
rights. The California and Washington courts would recognize
such claims, but would nonetheless allow the extraction if the
extractor was a public body with power to take water rights by
eminent domain. s A taking under statutory eminent domain
procedure requires that compensation be paid to the riparians
for the loss of their rights.
At first blush, the hypothetical posited at the beginning of this
article, in which the "public" challenges such an extraction
under the public trust doctrine, seems distinguishable from the
situation in Aitken and Martha Lake. However, the difference
becomes more illusory than real when one realizes that on nearly
all lakes of any significance the state also owns riparian land
(state highways, access roads, etc.) and thus holds riparian or
"public" rights on behalf of the public. That ownership entitles
the state to raise the same in-place water protection issues, and
to have them judged by essentially the same criteria, as when a
public trust issue is raised. In fact, the substance of the challenges would seem to be identical in the two situations.
110 United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). No state
court as yet has gone as far as Grand River.
...City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (3d Dist.
1935).
.. In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
13 No attempt is made here to analyze several complex issues that might,
under special facts or state statutes, affect these general statements. Different
state law rules on standing would obviously be relevant. Also important would
be the question whether in a given state a municipality can condemn the riparian rights accruing to a state by reason of state ownership of riparian land or
whether, if this authority is unclear, the current state government policy is not
to resist such action by a municipality.

1980]

Protectionfor Stream Flows and Lake Levels

261

(11) Under the public use cases, the courts could logically rule
that the public right of navigation and fishery on recreationally
navigable waters is enforceable not only against bed owners who
claim exclusive possessory rights to the surface, but also agair;At
appropriators whose water extractions threaten substantial damage to navigation, fishery and other public interests.
III.

IMPACT ON EXISTING WATER RIGHTS HOLDERS

Assuming that the public trust doctrine applies to conflicts
between water extractors and lake-level protectors, there still remains the critical question of whether and to what extent the
doctrine should apply to persons already holding appropriation
or other water-extraction rights.
A.

Tidelands

Suppose that trust-burdened property had been earlier conveyed into private ownership and now was being reclaimed by
the state for trust purposes. In Illinois Central " the court recognized that while "there may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a grant which the state ought to pay," it
would not affect the state's power to resume the trusts. In
Berkeley' 5 the California Supreme Court faced a similar situation on a large scale. California had conveyed to private owners
some 22,299 acres of tidelands, of which 4,186 acres had been
filled but not improved, and 3,666 acres had been both filled and
improved with structures. The state argued that all of this land
should again be subjected to the public trust. Instead, the court
decided to "balance the interests of the public in the tidelands
conveyed . . . against those of the land owners who hold title
under these conveyances." It then held that "[iun the harmonizing of these claims, the principle we apply is that the interests of
the public are paramount in property that is still physically
adaptable for trust uses, whereas the interests of the grantees
and their successors should prevail insofar as the tidelands have
been rendered substantially valueless for other purposes."1 116
14 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).

15 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515,
606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
I's

Id.
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Appropriative Rights

The ownership of appropriative rights is significantly different
than the ownership of tidelands and requires a different analysis. An appropriative water right is incorporeal. Its owner, unlike
the owner of a tract of land, does not own any particular unit of
water. The owner merely has a right to divert and use water now
and in the future. These differences must be accounted for when
considering the retroactivity issue.
Suppose that an extractor in a popular recreation site has a
legal right to appropriate more water than he has historically
put to use but presently plans to increase the extractions up to
the permitted maximum. The conflicts between his right to extract and the threatened damage to the public trust resource can
be analyzed through a mix of the appropriation and the public
trust doctrines.
Traditional appropriation doctrine principles may limit the
extraction to the amount that historically has been put to beneficial use. In a proper case the appropriator may even lose the
right to increase his extractions through a statutory forfeiture
proceeding 7 and could then be denied a new permit on the
ground that it is not in the public interest.11 8 Alternatively, the
public trust doctrine could prohibit future extractions that
threaten substantial damage to public trust interests, especially
where an appropriator has few equities in his favor and is basing
his right on the bare legal claim of the appropriative right.11 9
117 The unused portion of a water right may be declared abandoned. See
generally Trelease, supra note 28; W. HUTCHINS, supra note 8, at 225-444. The
question of loss of unused portions of an appropriative water right, above and
beyond that quantity put to actual and beneficial use, has also been addressed
with regard to transfer of water rights. See Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150
Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control,
578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978).
l* See 2 W. HUrCHINS, supra note 8, at 286-327.
11 In a license renewal dispute in Montana, the court was faced with the
question whether the public had a right to have sufficient water left in a
stream for the protection of trout. The court said:
The Commission does not deny that DePuy has a valid appropriative right to the water of Armstrong Spring Creek. In fact the Commission made no attempt to prove that the amount of water actually put to a beneficial use by DePuy was less than the amount
claimed and diverted. The Commission does maintain that the
public has a prior right in the waters of the creek which would require DePuy to release some water through a fishladder. The pub-
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A more complex question arises where the extractor is making
beneficial use of the full amount legally permitted, but where
continued extractions threaten substantial damage to public
trust interests. There is no way within the appropriation doctrine itself to limit such future extractions. Standard appropriation doctrine rules say that the extractor can continue taking
water regardless of the adverse or even disastrous consequences
for public trust interests.12 0 How would the public trust doctrine
affect such a case? In particular, how would the rules derived
from the Berkeley tidelands case apply to it?

At the outset a distinction should be noted between the rights
of an owner of tidelands and those of an owner of a water right.
Because a water right is incorporeal, no fill, building or other
structure can be built on it. The water itself is therefore, under
Berkeley, "still physically adaptable for trust uses," and has not
been "rendered substantially valueless" for trust purposes.
It is appropriate, nonetheless, to ask whether other underpinnings of the Berkeley test provide a basis for allowing extractors
lic right urged by the Commission would be based on the fact that
the public had used the creek as a fishing stream and natural fish
hatchery before DePuy built his dam. Under the rule of Bullerdick
v. Hermsmeyer, 32 Mont. 541, 81 P. 334 (1905), DePuy could not
use the water to the detriment of prior rights.
Such a public right has never been declared in the case law of
this state. California, an appropriation doctrine jurisdiction, whose
Constitutional provisions relating to water rights are virtually the
same as Article III, § 15 of the Montana Constitution, has recognized such a right and has upheld statutes requiring fishways. People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30, 15 P.2d 549
(3d Dist. 1952). Under the proper circumstances we feel that such a
public interest should be recognized. This issue will inevitably grow
more pressing as increasing demands are made on our water resources. An abundance of good trout streams is unquestionably an
asset of considerable value to the People of Montana.
Paradise Rainbows v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 148 Mont. 412, 421 P. 2d 717, 721
(1966).
120 An even more obvious case for the public trust doctrine to limit appropriations is where an application for an appropriation permit is being considered
by the state permitting agency. If substantial harm to public trust interests is
threatened by the issuance of the permit, then it should either be denied or
conditioned so as to protect those interests. Assuming that preservation and
protection of public trust resources is in the "public interest," most western
states have statutory or regulatory guidelines on how to handle the matter. See
1 W. HUrCHINS, supra note 8, at 409-15.

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 14

to continue diversions which threaten damage to public trust interests. The Berkeley test appears to be based on two broad criteria. First, the grantees of tidelands have an equitable argument in their favor because they have made a substantial
investment by building over or filling in the tidelands, all in reliance on the grant from the state. Second, returning the filled
lands to their former inundated tidelands status may be ecologically impossible, or at least so costly as to be out of proportion
to the public benefits to be achieved by that course of action.
What happens if we apply these Berkeley criteria to the facts
of a typical water extraction case? Under the first criterion, the
water extractors would be able to make an equitable argument
for continuing extractions because of their investment in constructing diversion works in reliance on appropriation permits
issued by the state. That investment surely must be considered
by a court in deciding whether future extractions should be limited by public trust interests.
Consideration of the second Berkeley criterion produces a different result. That criterion considers whether it is ecologically
impossible to recreate natural tidelands or whether the cost of
removing fills or buildings from the land is disproportionately
high when compared to the modest public trust benefits to be
achieved by such action. This same problem would simply not
occur in the ordinary water extraction situation. The only action
that would normally be required to make more water available
for public trust purposes would be to close the diversion gates or
turn off the pumps. There would seldom be substantial costs associated with such action, as there would be in physically removing a fill from tidelands.
Yet Berkeley is not a complete solution to the problem. There
are other factors that a court should consider in determining
where to draw the line between the appropriation and the public
trust doctrines. One must also consider the cost to the extractors
of obtaining water from alternative sources, or of doing without
the water. What would be the "conservation" cost to the extractor if no practical alternative sources are to be found? Are the
alternative sources of water so expensive or are the conservation
costs so high as to be comparable to the cost of removing fills
and buildings on tidelands? These are questions that will have
to be considered by the courts in deciding these issues.
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CONCLUSION

Many difficult questions will be posed by the application of
the public trust doctrine to protect in-place water users against
damage or destruction by water extractors. Few of these questions have been answered yet by the courts. Nonetheless, a few
useful comments about both judicial policy and procedure can
be made.
The most important policy consideration is the recognition
that public priorities have indeed changed. Judicial opinions
throughout the nation are already reflecting these changes and
will reflect them increasingly in the future. Courts everywhere
now recognize that in-place water uses must be legally protected,
and that the prior appropriation system itself fails to provide
adequate protection. The real question now is not whether but
how this protection is to be provided. The public trust doctrine
is an appropriate judicial theory on which to base such in-place
water protection and should be used for that purpose.
This in itself would be a significant judicial step forward and
would tend at the very least to focus debate on the right issues.
But changing the issues and the focus of debate goes only half
the distance. Vital questions remain. Just where is the line to be
drawn between these two conflicting doctrines? Just what is the
scope of the pre-existing servitude established by the public
trust doctrine? Under what set of facts will a court say that an
appropriator has overstepped the public trust boundary line?
Certainly it is not possible in this brief article to draw that line
so that it resolves all the multiple and varied problems that will
arise in future cases. The line will have to be drawn by judicial
decisions, and it will have to evolve out of the facts on a case-bycase basis.
This article suggests some basic guidelines that can aid courts
in analyzing these problems. Let us consider a typical and rather
fundamental question: To what extent should an administratively issued appropriation permit give the holder a legal right in
perpetuity to divert water from a river or lake regardless of the
adverse consequences to public navigation, fishery and environmental values? This question is likely to be central in future litigation between public trust advocates and appropriative rights
holders.
Judicious application of public trust criteria requires two procedural alternatives. The first is for the judiciary itself to apply
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the rather strict, common law public trust criteria to determine
when public trust resources can be committed to private or specialized-public uses.""1 This alternative is viable only if the case
is one where the court is procedurally capable of considering the
full range of factors that must be evaluated, including opportunity costs to both sides, in arriving at a wise decision. But that
may be difficult or impossible in many situations. Procedural
constraints often limit a court's ability to hear and to consider
the full range of alternatives on both sides. A court may find, for
example, that it cannot hear evidence on the cost of alternative
sources of water supply, the cost of potential conservation measures or the full range of economic and social impacts of its decisions. Parties that must be before the court in order to test the
issues fully may not be parties to the lawsuit.
If judicial consideration of these multiple factors is not feasible, then under public trust principles the appropriation should
be enjoined. The issue of allowing further damage to public trust
interests should then be entrusted to the legislative process. Unlike the courts, a legislature has the capacity to discover and
consider all factors in deciding the extent to which the waters in
question should be permanently committed to private or specialized-public uses. This second alternative also has the advantage
of allowing consideration and evaluation of contemporary public
priorities and social values. It places before the legislative body,
representing all of the people of the state, the critical issue of
where to draw the line between the public interest in navigation,
fishery and environmental quality, and the private or specialized-public interest in the extraction and use of particular
waters.
The prior appropriation system of water law is clearly deficient in its capacity to resolve the legitimate conflicts between
the public, which believes that it has a right to have waters left
in place for navigation, fishery, environmental quality and other
public trust uses, and appropriators who believe that they have
a right to extract these same waters for irrigation, municipal and
industrial purposes. The application of public trust principles to
these conflicts will aid in focusing the debate on the proper issues and in drawing a line that is consistent with society's current and future needs and values. Both logic and authority sup" See note 96 supra.
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port the application of the public trust doctrine in these
situations. As this article points out, the courts have already applied the public trust doctrine to protect in-place water uses in
many related situations, though often under various other labels
and guises. Consistency, clarity, coherence and predictability
would be served if more explicit recognition were given to the
public trust nature of these various in-place water protection
theories, and if the public trust doctrine were explicitly recognized as a constraint on the appropriation doctrine.

